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18 Executive Summary 
* Armed conflicts cause immense human suffering, destroy the efforts of human 
and economic development, undermine the solidarity among ACP countries, which 
is  the basis of the Lome partnership, and have an impact on European political, 
economic and security interests. 
*  Following  the  escalation  of the  Congo  crisis . into  a  regional  armed  conflict 
involving a number of countries from Central, Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Commission announced a review of co-operation with countries at war, to avoid the 
misuse  of funds  for  military purposes  and to  underscore the EU's appeal  for  a 
peaceful  settlement  of this  conflict.  This  review  exercise  applies  to  all  ongoing 
conflicts and military interventions in ACP countries, notably in Africa where the 
number, scope and intensity of armed conflicts has been rising dramatically during 
the last years. 
* In view ..of the close relationship established by the Lome Convention, the EU bas a 
sp.ecial  responsibility  to  assist  ACP  countries  in  finding  peaceful  solutions  to 
conflicts among them, but also the duty to ensure that any funds made available for 
ACP countries are used in  accordance with the provisions of this Convention and 
consistently  with  the  foreign  policy  objectives  enshrined  in  the  treaties  of the 
European  Union.  This  Communication  describes  various  measures  and  policy 
options available within the existing institutional and legal framework, in  order to 
enable the EU  to  react to  various conflict situations. It sets  out instruments· and 
strategic proposals, which might be used in the shaping of decisions, to be taken on 
a case-by-case basis by  the competent authorities.  With this Communication the 
Commission does  not seek to  imply  that this approach would  be valid  for  other 
geographical areas since  each  geograpi.Jical  zone  has  its  own  t!haracteristics  and 
specificities. 
Measures within the Lome Convention and Community framework: 
* The main purpose of the announced review is to ensure that Community funds are 
used in accordance with the principles and objectives of the Lome Convention, and 
in  particular to prevent a diversion of funds for belligerent purposes. In order to 
improve  the existing  control  mechanisms,  the Commission  is  introducing  in  all 
financing conventions concerning direct budgetary support, provisions to allow for 
disbursements of funds in  instalments as well as periodic evaluations of the use of 
funds, requesting full budgetary transparency from beneficiary governments. These 
evaluations are carried out in  close  co-operation with  the international financial 
institutions. 
* A  freezing,  reduction  or suspension  of development  aid  as  a  reaction  to  the 
outbreak of  armed conflict may occur under the following circumstances: 
1)  Freezing or discontinuation of individual programmes if funds are, or can be, 
diverted to military activities or the provision of weapons or military equipment: If 
the  use  of Community funds  by  the  beneficiary  country  remains  doubtful,  the 
Commission  bas to take appropriate steps to prevent them from  being mis-used. 
These steps may include the freezing of implementation to allow for investigation, or 
3 the  discontinuation  of certain  programmes or projects,  if there  is  evidence  that 
funds  allocated  to  these  programmes  or  projects  are  diverted  to  belligerent 
purposes. 
2) Suspension of aid under the 366a procedure of the Lome Convention: In case of 
serious  violations  of human  rights  or of other essential  elements  referred  to  in 
Article 5 of the Lome Convention as a consequence of armed conflicts, the European 
Community shall request consultations under the procedure referred to in Article 
366a, and may decide to suspend development co-operation or other aspects of the 
Convention with a given country. 
3)  Sanctions imposed by the UN  Security Council: A suspension  of aid may also 
occur in compliance with sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council. 
In  such  cases~ the  relevant  provisions  of UNSC  resolutions  are  translated  into 
Community legislation. 
* Freezing or suspension of aid with  the objective of persuading governments to 
cease  bo~tilities and to  seek peaceful solutions  to conflict,  will  have  to  take into 
account the following aspects: the degree of fungibility of funds, the political and 
social impact of suspension measures, and the administrative flexibility of freezing 
and resuming aid programmes. These aspects vary considerably among the various 
instruments  (direct budgetary support, including  in  the  framework  of food  aid 
programmes, STABEX/SYSMIN, programme support, project aid, or decentralised 
co-operation). There bas to be a case-by-case assessment for each country and aid 
instrument, albeit within the overall context of the crisis in  which  the respective 
country is involved. Any measure involving the freezing or suspension of aid bas to 
be  applied in an even-banded and proportional manner, taking into account the 
scope of the security threat and the respective responsibility of all involved actors. 
* Apart from the freezing or suspension of existing programmes, the Commission 
has to consider whether it is  advisable to approve or implement new programmes, 
notably those concerning budgetary aid (structural adjustment support, food  aid 
programmes, ST  ABEX, SYSMIN), for countries involved in  armed conflicts. The 
implications of such decisions will  be brought by the Commission to the Council 
within  the  appropriate  institutional  framework,  with  a  view  to  agreeing  on  a 
barmonised EU position for both Community and bilateral aid. 
* Humanitarian aid should be extended wherever the need  arises and where the 
required security conditions exist. It should not be subject to political objectives. 
Nonetheless,  it  bas  to  be  fully  recognised  that  humanitarian  aid  may  have 
unintended political effects, and that it can be exposed to political and even strategic 
manipulation.  Its potential  impact on  the dynamics  of conflict  situations should 
therefore be carefully assessed. 
Options for the Common Foreign and Security Policy: 
* The review of co-operation with countries involved in armed conflicts should be 
part of a comprehensive strategy for conflict management and resolution within the 
CFSP framework. The policy response of the European Union bas to be flexible and 
adapted to the actual situation in each crisis region. It bas to take into account the 
4 historical; social;. economic  an~ political  rea~ons for the outbreak of hostilities as 
well a's the motivations of  all actors i'nvolved:·  .  .  . 
*  General  guidelines  for  a  comprehensive  EU  policy  approach  towards  armed 
conflicts, encompassing measures to be taken in  the appropriate Community and 
CFSP in~ance.s, can be outlined;for tbt: followin&  typi~al sit.uations: 
(a)  Outbreak,  escalation  or  extens.ion  of. an  armed  corifljct:  The  outbreak  of 
hostilities leads in most' cases to a partial or total discontinuation of  development co-
operatiqp.Jo,r. security.  re~s~ns in tbe countries or areas directly affected by armed 
conflict. ':fhe _co~tinuatioll of  .co-oper~ttion.,programmes, either on  a  partial basis 
with.regar~s tQ  count.ri~s,  dire~tly affected by bostilitie.~, or to countries involved in 
arme~ con Diet  abroad, involves  the  risk of a  diversion :  ~f  Jqnds for .  belligerent 
purposes  •. This problem has to be addressed. by appropriate Community measures 
referred to .abpve. Within the CFSP framework, the Europe~n Union should make 
full  use  of  available  policy  instruments  (Presidency  declarations,  Common 
Positions, Joint Actions, Troika missions, the appointment of Special Envoys etc.) 
with  the. aim  of  persuading  belligerents  to  seek  negotiated  solutions  to  their 
differences. \Vhere armed conflicts are accompanied by violations of the essential 
elements of the Lome Convention, a partial or total suspension of aid should be set 
in  motion to encourage a cessation of hostilities and political dialogue. In order to 
ensure a coherent approach and maximum impact of the EU's policy, any decision 
to  suspend  Community  aid  should  be  accompanied  by  similar  action  by  EU 
Member States with regard to their bilateral aid. 
(b)  Cessation  of hostilities  and negotiations:  In the context of this  scenario,  the 
CFSP response should support dialogue and negotiations and, if required, peace-
keeping  initiatives,  with  the  appropriate  instruments  (e.g.  declarations,  Troika 
missions, or missions of Special Envoys) and Community measures (e.g.  financial 
support  or  technical  assistance  for~ mediation  or  political  dialogue).  The 
Commission, as well as EU member states through bilateral co-operation, can offer 
technical and financial assistance for post-conflict activities in  the socio-economic 
field  (e.g.  reconciliation  initiatives,  demobilisation,  reintegration  of refugees  and 
displaced people, rehabilitation). The European Union may also consider providing 
financial,  technical,  material or human resources  for  international peacekeeping 
operations.  The acceptance  of mediators  or fora  for  negotiations  by  all  parties 
concerned are crucial for a durable success of peace talks, and so is the achievement 
of  compromises acceptable to all stakeholders, including local actors. 
(c) Breakdown of state authority: The erosion of state authority and administrative 
capacity  in  many  African  countries  bas  created  a  particular  risk  of a  durable 
breakdown of state authority (e.g. Somalia, Southern Sudan). In such cases, normal 
economic  and political  relations are discontinued. In order to  protect vulnerable 
population  groups,  the European Union  can  extend  humanitarian aid and basic 
social  sector  assistance  through  UN  agencies,  international  organisations  and 
NGOs.  In certain cases, the European Union  may consider specific  political  and 
economic  support  to  countries  neighbouring  "vanished  states"  which  threaten 
regional security. Such support to "front line states" should be contingent on  the 
readiness of the beneficiary governments to respect human rights and democratic 
principles, and to ensure full transparency of military expenditures. 
5 * In cases where the escalation of  armed conflicts leads to humanitarian disasten or 
grave  violations  of human ·rights,  notably  "ethnic  cleansing"  or genocide,  the 
provisions of Chapter V~I of the UN Charter may be relevant. 
*** 
* Both CFSP actions and Community measures taken Ia response to armed conOicts. 
require  close  co-operation  with  other  major  acton,  notably  OAU,  realonal 
organisations, the United Nations and the Bretton Woods Institutions. 
* The policy  response to  armed conflicts  has to be considered  as  an  emergency 
reaction to situations where the prevention of coaOict has failed.  Tbe urgency to 
react to political crises should not divert the attention of the European Union from 
the need  to further strengthen efforts  to contribute to  the prevention  of violent 
conDlcts at an early stage by addresslag tlaelr root causes In a taraeted manner and 
with an adequate combination of  aU available Community and CFSP Instruments. 
6 l.  BACKGROUND  AND  MOTIVATION  FOR  A  REVIEW  OF  RELATIONS  WITH 
COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN ARMED CONFLICTS 
Following the escalation of the armed conflict In  the Democratic Republic of 
Congo into a regional  war involving an  increasing number of countries from  Central, 
Eastern and Southern Africa, the Commission proposed that  "the E U should consider 
reviewing its co-operation  with  countries presently at war against each  other".  The 
message was launched on 5 September 1998  at  a meeting of EU Foreign Ministers in 
Salzburg. It was also referred to  during the sessions of the European Parliament on  17 
September and of  the EU-ACP Joint Assembly on 21 September. 
The message was meant to be a "mise en garde", and it focused initially on the 
Central African crisis. However, it is clear that the Commission and the European Union 
cannot tum their backs on  other conflicts in or among ACP  count~es, some of which 
have escalated into major armed confrontations (notably Ethlopla/Erltrea); the EU also 
has to consider the political implications of  military interventions by African states in the 
context  of conlicts  in  neighbouring  countries  (SenegaVGuinea/Guinea-Bissau  and 
South Africa/Botswana/Lesotho).  Furthermore,  the  Commission's  concern  about  the 
possible  diversion of community  funds  does  not  only  apply  to  armed  confrontations 
between states, but also to internal armed conflicts, which can consume a considerable 
amount  of resources,  as  well  as  to  cases  of excessive  military  expenditure.  The 
distinction  between  internal  conflicts  and  inter-state  armed  confrontations  is  often 
blurred,  notably  in  Africa,  where  the  OAU  resolution  concerning  post-colonial 
boundaries'  has  spared  the  continent  during  almost  three  decades  from  a potentially 
devastating  redrawing  of national  frontiers  by military  means.  A  number  of internal 
conflicts have well-known cross-border ramifications and carry a daunting potential for 
an escalation of  inter-state violence, as the Congo crisis has shown. 
All armed conflicts, whether internal or external, are devastating. Apart from  the 
direct  victims  of war,  they  are  destroying  the  efforts  of decades  of human  and 
economic  development,  which  have  been  supported  by  the  European  Union  with 
considerable  financial  resources.  Interstate  armed  conflicts  are  also  undermining  the 
relationship among ACP countries, which is based on friendly relations and solidarity2, 
and they are adversely affecting the EU-ACP relationship.  Conflicts can also threaten 
European  political and commercial interests and they may potentially threaten  the 
security of European citizens.  If a considerable part of Africa plunges  into  chaos  and 
violence,. present problems of  refugees, drug and arms trade and other criminal activities, 
and possibly terrorist attacks, may become serious security concerns for Europe. 
2 
OAU AHG/Resolution 16 (1),  adopted in Cairo in  1964. This resolution did not totally prevent 
Africa from  inter-state conflicts,  but such conflicts  have been rare  (e.g.  Libya-Chad,  Senegal-
Mauritania), taking into account the disparity between the geopolitical architecture of Africa on 
the one hand, and traditional socio-ethnic structures on the other. 
Ref. preamble and paragraph 1 of  the Lome Convention 
7 The  European  Union  c;annot  remain  indifferent  to  the  increasing  number  and 
growing intensity of armed conflicts in Africa.  Its response to these conflicts should be 
based on the general objectives of  containment, protection, and conflict resolutionJ: 
(a)  Containment:  In  the  first  place,  the  European  Union  should prevent  fuelling 
conflicts through· its assistance,  directly or indirectly,  and  try to  prevent  them 
spreading to other countries; the European Union should apply an even-banded 
approach to all parties in a conflict, unless one side can be clearly designated as 
the  aggressor;  it  should  avoid  getting  drawn  involuntarily  into  a  conflict  by 
supporting or sanctioning one side or the other through development assistance. 
(b)  Protection: The European Union should try to  protect vulnerable population 
groups by targeted  and  closely monitored  humanitarian  aid  and  social  sector 
assistance; furthermore, it should be prepared to  consider appropriate action,  in 
co-ordination  with  the  wider  international  community,  to  protect  threatened 
population groups from  genocide or large-scale "ethnic cleansing"; finally,  the 
European Union should ensure the security of European citizens who may find 
themselves. in countries or areas directly affected by hostilities, it should strive to 
protect the achievements of development co-operation, and safeguard European 
economic interests and investments in Africa. 
(c)  Conflict resolution: Above all, the European Union should support any effort to 
seek sustainable negotiated solutions to all aspects of  crises in and among ACP 
countries, at the international, regional and local levels. 
In  view  of the  close  relationship  with  ACP  countries  through  the  Lome 
Conveation, the European Community has a particular respoasiblllty to react to the 
multiplication  of armed  conflicts  and  the  increased  trend  towards  foreign  military 
intervention in Africa. It has to develop clear strategic: principles in order to react to 
various scenarios, and  elaborate ways  for  putting these  strategies  into  practice.  The 
European Community also has to consider bow it should react in the medium ter.:n to 
the possible scenario of protracted warfare in various regions in Africa and on the 
impact of this on the post-Lome negotiations. The Convention presently in force does 
I  . 
not include specific provisions referring to the prevention, management and resolution of 
armed conflicts in Africa.  The negotiating directives for  a new partnership agreement 
with the ACP countries propose the inclusion of provisions for a strengthened EU-ACP 
political  dialogue.  This will  provide  a  framework  for  addressing  the  concerns of the 
European  Union  with  regards  to  violent  conflicts  and  their  impact  on  the  EU-ACP 
relations.  In addition to this, the inclusion in the new agreement of specific provisions 
3  This is to be distinguished from the conflict prevention initiative referred to in particular in the 
Communication of the Commission on "Peace-building and Conflict Prevention in Africa" of 6 
March  1996,  the  Common  Position  and  Council  Conclusions  on  "Conflict  Prevention  and 
Resolution in Africa" of2 June 1997, and the Council Conclusions on the "Role of  Development 
Co-operation  in  Strengthening  Peace-Building,  Conflict  Prevention  and  Resolution"  of 30 
November  1998.  These  policy  documents  elaborate  on  strategies  to  prevent  the  outbreak  of 
conflicts,  mainly  by  promoting  stable  and  democratic  political  systems.  ·conflict  prevention 
initiatives focus on activities during times of peace. While there are areas of overlap with these 
initiatives, it has to be stressed that the policy outlined in the present document is designed as a 
reaction of  the European Union to already ongoing or escalating armed conflicts. 
8 concerning the impact of  armed conflicts on the development and foreign policy relations 
between the EU and ACP countries, should be considered. 
The purpose of  the present Communication is: 
(a) to  inform Member States of measures taken by the Commission to enhance the 
control of community funds made available to  ACP countries in order to  avoid their 
diversion for belligerent purposes and to reduce the risks emanating from the inherent 
fungibility of  funds within a national budget; 
(b)  to  outline  policy  options  available  within  the  ex1stmg  institutional  and  legal 
structures (Lome Convention, CFSP, and international law) in order to enable the EU to 
react to various conflict scenarios. It is a set of instruments and strategies intended to 
assist in  the shaping of decisions, not to prescribe solutions.  Specific policy decisions 
have to be taken on a case-by-case basis by the competent authorities. 
This  Communication  is  intended  to  provide  a  framework  for  discussion.  The 
document is limited to ACP countries but the Commission recognises the utility for the 
EU  to  seek over time to  establish a coherent strategy extending to  other geographical 
regions.  The Commission  does  not, however, seek to imply at this stage that the 
approach set out in  this  Communication  would be valid  for other geographical 
areas since each geographical zone bas its own characteristics and specificities. 
2.  MEASURES RELATED TO EU DEVELOPMENT Co-OPERATION 
(a)  INITIATIVES  TAKEN  BY  THE  COMMISSION  10  REINFORCE  THE  CONTROL  OF 
COMMUNITY FUNDS 
The Lame Convention's primary objective, as stated in Article· I, is "to promote 
and  expedite the economic, cultural and social development of the  ACP  States and to 
consolidate  and  diversify  their relations  in a  spirit of solidarity  and  mutual  interest". 
While military activities of  ACP countries are not necessarily in contradiction with these 
basic objectives, it is clear that the outbreak of an armed conflict among ACP countries 
represents ipso facto a breach of  this "spirit of  solidarity", and of  the "friendly relations" 
referred  to  in the  Preamble of ~he Convention. It would  therefore contrary to the 
objectives of the Convention to use development assistance for belligerent activities 
among ACP countries. 
The Commission is monitoring the use of all funds provided under the different 
instruments of  the Lome Convention as a matter of  routine. Nonetheless, the outbreak of 
violent conflict increases the risk of diversion of funds  for  military purposes, notably 
those funds that are directly fungible within an overall national budget. 
The allocation of  Community funds to projects or programmes in ACP countries 
is  ruled  by standard  financing  agreements  negotiated  between  the  EU  and  the  ACP 
countries. The economic or budgetary sectors as well as the modalities of payment are, 
however, specified in technical and administrative annexes ("dispositions techniques et 
administratives")  of financing  conventions  that  are  prepared  for  each  programme 
individually.  This allows the Commission to  introduce enhanced control mechanisms, 
such as payments in instalments and provisions for periodic evaluations of the use of 
community funds, based on full transparency of public expenditure, including long-
9 term obligations.  In  cases where budgetary transparency is  not  granted,  these control 
mechanisms would allow the implementation of  the programmes concerned to be frozen 
to allow for an investigation. If there is evidence of diversion or mis-use of funds, such 
programmes will be immediately terminated. As part of the aid review announced by the 
Commission, it has been ensured that such control mechanisms have been inserted in all 
new  financing  conventions  with  countries  involved  in  armed  conflicts  (e.g.  those 
referring to budgetary aid for Chad, Ethiopia and Rwanda). 
At  present,  these  control  mechanisms  apply  only  to  new  programmes  of 
budgetary aid to countries involved in armed  conflicts. The general application of the 
"control  clauses"  to  all  new  budgetary  aid  in  all  countries  would  have  the  merit  of 
avoiding discrimination, which could be contested by the countries concerned.  On  the 
other hand,  the  selective  application  of these  measures  ensures  a  political  impact,  a 
"message" the Community wants to send to countries involved in armed conflicts. 
When releasing financial  assistance to countries engaged in  armed conflicts, the 
Commissioner responsible for the relations with ACP countries will also send letters to 
the Heads of State or Government requesting written assurances that no funds are 
diverted  for  belligerent  purposes.  Furthermore,  the  Commission  is  raising  these 
concerns in meetings with the international finance institutions and other donors in order 
to  ensure  close  co-ordination  in  the  monitoring  of development  assistance  and  in 
particular budgetary aid. 
The outbreak of  armed conflicts may make it necessary to temporarily freeze the 
implementation by withholding the conclusion of agreements and the disbursement 
of funds, to allow for the introduction of the before-mentioned control mechanisms, or 
for an in-depth review of the use of funds.  The Government of the beneficiary country 
concerned will be informed of this measure and has the occasion to  explain the nature 
and objectives of  its involvement in an armed conflict. 
(b)  SITUATIONS WHICH MAY REQUIRE THE SUSPENSION OF AID OR OTHER SANCTIONS 
The enhanced control of  the use of  Community funds is part of  the Commission's 
responsibilities for  the  implementation of the Lome Convention. It is  an  indispensable 
measure  to  ensure  that  Community  funds  are  used  for  the  purposes  stated  in  the 
provisions  of the  Convention  and  for  the  specific  purposes  defined  in  individual 
financing agreements. It cannot, however, address the problem of indirect fungibility: 
Even if EU funds are allocated to  specific economic or social sectors, they increase the 
availability of national resources for military purposes - and may thus fuel  a war.  This 
becomes particularly relevant  if a conflict continues  for  a long  time  and  consumes  a 
considerable amount of the national resources of  the countries involved. 
The issue of indirect fungibility confronts the European Union with a number of 
problems. In cases of a recognised risk of indirect fungibility, i.e. when it appears clear 
that a given country would not be able to sustain a war effort without foreign assistance 
to ensure basic administrative and social services, there is a need to assess the legitimacy 
of the  country's military  involvement  under existing  international  law.  Countries will 
usually argue that they are acting within the framework of individual or collective self-
defence referred to in Art. 51  of the UN Charter. The UN Security Council is the only 
universally recognised authority to assess - and possibly challenge - the legitimacy of a 
country's involvement in an armed conflict, and it may decide to impose sanctions such 
10 as those referred to under Article 41  of the UN Charter4. A UNSC resolution imposing 
the Interruption of economic relations to a given country may entail the suspension 
of development assistance to that country by the member states of the European 
Unions and by the European Community. 
In  cases where  the  UN  Security  Council  has  not  decided  upon sanctions,  the 
Lome .convention in  its present form does  not Include a legal base which  would 
allow for a reduction or suspension of development aid only because of uajusdfled 
involvement in  an armed conflict.  This would only be justified within the range of 
application of  relevant rules of  the. Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties of 1969, or 
general  international  law  (notably force  majeur in  case of security risks,  or clausula 
rebus  sic  stantibus,  e.g.  if the  central  state  authority  vanishes,  as  was  the  case  in 
Somalia).6 
At  present, the  suspension  procedure referred  to  in Article 366a, in  relation 
with  Article  S,  applies  exclusively  in  cases  where  the  specifically  stated  "essential 
elements"  of the  Lome  Convention,  namely  respect  for  human  rights,  democratic 
principles, and the rule of law, are violated. In many cases of recent or ongoing anned 
conflicts in Africa, this procedure would in fact be applicable in view of  widespread and 
extensively documented human  rights  violations.  Neither Article 366a nor Article 5 
limit  the  applicability  of  the  procedure  to  human  rights  violations  inside  the 
geographical borders of the beneficiary state. It is perfectly imaginable to launch the 
procedure if the army of a given state is committing human rights violations in another 
country. 
With  regard  to  new  programmes, notably of budgetary aid where  the  risk of 
diversion of funds  and fungibility is  particulc1Tly high, the Commission has to consider 
4 
s 
6 
There are rare cases of  sanctions imposed by other institutions than the UN Security Council, e.g. 
the  embargo  imposed  against  Burundi  by  Cameroon  (as  acting  OAU  Presidency),  Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Rwanda,  Tanzania,  Uganda and Zaire on 31
11  July  1996. The Burundi Government has 
persistently (albeit unsuccessfully) challenged the legitimacy of this embargo. It was suspended 
on 23 January 1999. 
UNSC  resolutions  are  binding  for  UN  member states.  In  accordance  with Article  1  03  of the 
Charter,  such  obligations  overrule  any  other  international  agreement,  including  the  Lome 
Convention.  An  unresolved  problem,  however,  is  the  question  of legitimacy  of military 
intervention by sub-regional organisations without a UNSC mandate, notably in cases where such 
interventions are not considered by the international community as a reaction to a security threat 
to the countries concerned, i.e. where Art. 51  of the UN Charter does not seem to be applicable. 
The principle of subsidiarity stipulated in Article 52 of the UN Charter explicitly recognises the 
competence of regional arrangements for security matters, but remains silent about the legitimacy 
of  military intervention. 
The  EU  can  also  adopt  visa  and  residence  restrictions,  exclude  certain  countries  of the 
participation in sport competitions, or prohibit the export of arms within the CFSP framework, 
provided that such sanctions lie outside the area of application of the Lome Convention. In this 
context, it is worth recalling the ruling of  the European Court of  Justice on the case C 162196, A 
Racke, of 16 June 1998 (IECR 1998, p.  3688-3709) regarding Council Regulation EEC 3300/91 
suspending the trade concessions provided for by the Co-operation Agreement between the EEC 
and the Socialist Federal Republic of  Yugoslavia. 
11 whether it is advisable to grant such aid to countries involved in  anned conflicts. The 
Commission will ensure that the political dimension of such decisions Is  brought to 
the attention of  the Council within the appropriate institutional framework. 
(c)  POLITICAL  AND  SOCio-ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS  RELATED  TO  THE  FREEZING 
OR SUSPENSION OF AID 
The freezillg or suspension of aid is a measure in atnMis which will not be 
applied unless all other instruments (control of the use of funds, political dialogue etc.) 
have been  exhausted or proved inadequate.  Where it is  applied,  it has  to be carefully 
modulated and adapted in order to put maximum pressure on aU  parties involved to 
cease  hostilities  and to seek negotiated solutions,  wiiUe  mlnimilln&  the aegative 
social effects  of a  reduction  or suspension  of aid.  This  requires  a  cue-by-case 
analysis, taking into account the following general considerations: 
(a) Based on the simple objective of avoldia& use of development funds for military 
purposes,  the  basic  variable  influencing  the  choice  of options  is  the  degree . of 
faagibllity of  funds, i.e. the speed and ease with which funds can be deviated to military 
efforts. The main benchmarks on an abstract scale from "very high to very low" would 
generally be (i) direct budgetary support (including in the  framework  of food  security 
programmes),  (ii)  ST  ABEX/SYSMIN,  (iii)  sectoral  assistance  through  ministerial 
departments, (iv) project aid, (v) decentralised co-operation, (vi) projects or programmes 
exclusively  implemented  by  NGOs.  Nonetheless,  certain  projects  falling  under  the 
category (iv)  can be  considered highly fungible,  either because they consist of quasi-
budgetary aid or because they are substitutes for investments foreseen in the government 
budget. 
(b)  If the  objective  is  larger,  e.g.  the  establishment of a  general  policy  not  only 
addressed to countries already involved in anned conflicts, but also as a deterrent for 
tbe future,  the  mai~ variable  is  the  degree of political  staniflcance.  For instance, 
already the announcement of an aid review can have an important political effect. The 
announcement to  review structural adjustment support is likely to  have a considerable 
impact on markets, foreign investor, and thus the economy of a given country. On the 
other hand, the rejection of  a request for the financing of  a large health project might be 
politically less effective than the freezing of aid that deals with core issues of domestic 
politics (e.g. land reform). The political significance is not directly related to the degree 
of  fungibility or the size of  a project; it has to be judged entirely on a case-by-case basis. 
(c)  The  effect  on  poverty  alleviation  efforts  has  to  be  taken  into  account.  Many 
programmes financed from Community funds are geared towards the social sectors, so a 
suspension  is  likely  to  undermine  or  jeopardise  poverty  alleviation  efforts.  The 
Commission should consider ways to mitigate such damage,  if required by extending 
assistance  through  other  channels  than  Government  institutions  (NGOs,  community-
based organisations). It may, however, be difficult to launch rapidly such measures of 
substitution, particularly in countries with a poorly developed civil society. It should also 
be noted that social hardship is not just a possible consequence of a reduction of aid to 
countries involved in anned conflicts, but in the first place a direct consequence of  armed 
conflict itself: The most vulnerable population groups are the people who live in the areas 
where the fighting takes place; people in other countries may suffer from a reduction of 
aid, but they are not the primary victims of  a conflict. 
12 (d) A further consideration that needs to be taken into account if already ongoing projects 
or programmes are to be suspended, is the ease of freezing and resumption of aid. The 
freezing of  disbursements of counterpart funds,  for instance, is a measure which can be 
lifted easily and without any administrative delays. The suspension of large decentralised 
co-operation  programmes  might,  on  the  contrary,  put  implementing  NGOs  in  dire 
financial straits, and can, in certain cases, destroy years of  work. Likewise, a suspension 
of projects  involving  technical  assistance  or procurement  tenders  could  entail  legal 
disputes that might not be solved long after the suspension has been revoked. There is a 
duty towards private sector implementation partners to  ensure,  as  far  as  possible, that 
they  are  kept  informed  of developments,  and  that  their  claims  for  loss  following 
suspension are promptly investigated and .settled. In this context, there might be a need to 
take into account possible consequences for private sector participants in  the technical 
and administrative annexes of  financing agreements. 
(e) In cases where a conflict affects or divides states of a regional group,  regional co-
opention programmes may be disrupted.  The Commission may  need  to  review  the 
affected regional programmes to bring them in  line with the EU policy with regards to 
individual-countries or the whole of  a regional group. 
(f) Co-operation programmes vary greatly from one country to another, and a suspension 
of development  aid  under  the  366a  procedure  can  lead  to  imbalanced  pressure  on 
different countries.  The leverage of EU aid therefore has to  be taken  into  account in 
order to avoid distortions and unfair treatment ("even-handedness"). 
(g)  An  eventual  suspension  of aid  to  government  institutions  does  not  prevent  the 
continuation  of  assistance  via  non-governmental  organisations.  Apart  from 
humanitarian aid (including food  aid In  the context of emergency assistance), this 
may  include  aid  for  basic  social  sectors or  reconstruction.  It would  be a  mistake, 
however, to consider this form of assistance as "non-political"; even if its intentions are 
not  to  support  any  warring  faction,  the  Impact  of humanitarian  aid  and  NGO 
assistance  has  to  be carefully  assessed.  Aid  to  areas  controlled  by  War  Lords  in 
Somalia or Southern Sudan, or to refugee camps in Kivu which were entirely controlled 
by an extremist military group, are striking examples of the possibility of manipulating 
humanitarian assistance for political or military means . 
••• 
As set out above, there are a number of  measures to be taken by the Commission 
by virtue of  its responsibility for the proper management and control of  Community fund. 
Where appropriate, the EDF Committee will be consulted. Nonetheless, positions of the 
Member States, Including those regarding their bilateral relations and bilateral aid, 
are relevant in order to ensure a consistent and coherent EU  approach to conflict 
situations In ACP countries. 
3.  SCENARIOS AND POLICY OPTIONS 
The outbreak or escalation of anned conflict affects not  only the  co-operation 
relationship  with  the  countries  concerned,  but  all  aspects  of political  and  economic 
relations and in certain cases, the security for European citizens. The response to  crisis 
13 situations  in  ACP  countries is therefore  a  matter to  which the  Common  Foreign and 
Security Policy of the European Union is highly relevant. The CFSP response to armed 
conflict should focus on aspects that are not covered by the Lome framework,  while a 
coherent  approach between Community-related policy measures  and CFSP positions 
and actions should be ensured. 
Although strategic responses within the CFSP framework have  to  be designed 
individually for each crisis situation, it is possible to identify various scenarios and to 
identify guidelines for strategic responses by the European Union, in co-ordination with 
other  actors  of the  international  community,  notably  the  United  Nations  and  the 
Organisation of African  Unity.  For the  purpose of outlining comprehensive policy 
orientations  across  the  "fir~t" and  "second  pillars",. the  following  considerations 
encompass both development co-operation and CFSP issues (certain measures described 
under chapter 2 are mentioned again in order to situate them within the CFSP context). 
The  three  conflict  situations  outlined  below  each  represent  a  typical  conjuncture  in 
contemporary conflicts to which the international community needs to respond. A range 
of  possible responses to each situation is discussed. 
(a)  OUTBREAK OR EsCALATION OF AN ARMED CONFLICT 
The  escalation  of a  crisis  in  Kivu  (eastern  Congo)  into  a  regional  war  with 
international connections has shown the explosive potential of local conflicts in Africa. 
An obscure network of regional  alliances across (and sometimes beyond) sub-Saharan 
Africa  has  led  to  a  situation  which  can  potentially tum small  local  conflicts  on  the 
continent into regional wars. 
Implications for development co-operation and EU policy options: 
(i)  As  a  direct  result  of any  outbreak  or  escalation  of hostilities,  development  co-
operation gets usually severely curtailed and this leads to a discontinuation of aid for 
security reasons. For C01Jntries involved in armed conflicts, including states "outside the 
battlefield", but which are involved with troops in a conflict, the possibility of  a diversion 
of  scarce resources for belligerent purposes arises, and the Commission needs to take the 
appropriate steps outlined under chapter 2 above. Such steps may include a suspension of 
aid  under the  366a procedure or a co-ordinated  position of·the Commission  and  EU 
member states to abstain from granting new programmes of budgetary aid. In such 
cases, a coherent and consistent position of the EU is imperative and countries in a 
comparable situation shall be treated in an equal manner. 
(ii) In addition to the reduction or suspension of  development aid, or the "freeze" of  new 
budgetary aid,  such measures may include restrictions of arms exports, commercial 
relations,  capital  flows  or investments,  the  refusal  to  grant visas  or residence 
permits  to  representatives  of  governments  or  leaders  of  armed  groups,  the 
severance of communication links (e.g. air embargoes, telecommunication restrictions), 
the  exclusion  from  the  participation  of sports  competitions  etc.  Trade  restrictive 
measures may be taken pursuant to UN Security Council resolutions, in which case they 
are  covered  by  the  exceptions  contained  in  WTO  rules  (e.g.  Article  XXI(c)  of the 
GATT).  Where  such  measures  are  not  based  on UNSC  resolutions,  they  have  to  be 
compatible with international trade rules and other relevant international legislation. Any 
14 Interruption  of  economic  or  commercial  relations,  has  to  be  formalised  as 
Community lqlslatlon  7• 
(iii) These measures may be accompanied, if appropriate, by a political message in the 
form of  Troika  tl~m11rches to the governments concerned, notably to ask them to explain 
the  reasons  for  their  involvement  and,  in  case  of a  suspension  of aid,  to  request 
information on military expenditures, if such information has not been disclosed earlier 
to the Commission. 
(iv)  The  planning  and  implementation  of peacemaking efforts within  the  escalation 
scenario is essentially the task of the Security Council, sometimes in consultation with 
regional organisations, notably OAU.  The EU should however be involved from  very 
early stages of planning, since in most cases,  EU member states will be requested to 
provide financial or logistical assistance for such operations. EU Special Envoys may be 
instrumental in easurfng co-ordination of  such UN and OAU efforts with EU policies. 
(v) The "escalation scenario" could include, e.g. in the Great Lakes region, the risk of 
aenocide pr large-scale "ethnic cleansing". In such cases, the provisions of  Chapter VII 
of  the UN Charter may be relevant. Since it is extremely difficult to assess the risk of  an 
escalation of  ethnic violence and to plan a timely intervention, contingency plaas should 
be drawn up early for geographical areas with a known potential for ethnic violence. In 
its  political  assessment,  the  European  Union  should  be particularly  attentive  to  the 
potential risk of"ethnic cleansing" and genocide. 
(vi) The European Union is  considering various  measures to enhance the control of 
arms Rows  to countries involved in armed conflicts.  In particular,  full  use should be 
made of  existing EU initiatives in this field, including the EU Programme for Preventing 
and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms, adopted by the Council on 26 
July 1997, the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, adopted on 8 June 1998, and the 
Joint Action on the EU's contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and 
spread of small arms and  light weapons, adopted on 17  December 1998. The latter, in 
particular,  includes  the  encouragement  of  adopting  similar  measures  in  various 
international fora. 
(vii) The Community's role in the framework of the "escalation scenario" is in the first 
place related to the Commission's assessment of the security situation to  evaluate the 
feasibility  of  humanitarian  aid  and  assistance  to  basic  social  secton  and 
rehabilitation via NGOs. The Commission also has a responsibility to assess the impact 
of  such aid on the dynamics of  conftict. 
7  Whether this would include arms exports is  a moot question. Arms are goods that in principle fall 
under the  scope of Article  133  of the  Treaty  of the  European  Community.  Article  296  is  not a 
reservation of national competence, but an  exception to the exclusive competence of the European 
Community in respect of the external commercial policy regarding goods. Furthermore, it should be 
noted that certain non-military goods might be used in military conflicts (e.g. confiscation of 4-wheel 
drive vehicles and communication equipment from humanitarian agencies in the Democratic Republic 
of  Congo, in 1996 and 1998, by rebel forces). 
15 (b)  CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND NEGOTIATIONS · 
A cessation of hostilities and  the  initiation of negotiations  represent usually a 
crucial phase In  the dynamics of conflict. It can be a "window of opportunity" or the 
prelude for a renewed escalation. 
Comprehensive crisis management and resolution under this scenario has to take 
into account the following aspects: 
(i) Depending on the specific circumstances of each conflict, various configurations for 
the  most  appropriate  framework  for  mediation  and  negotiation  will  have  to  be 
considered:  confidential bilateral talks or consultations among a  small number of 
major players; national conferences; the use of a  mediator; negotiations under a 
regional or international framework; transparent multinational dialogue under UN 
or OAU auspices etc. A common obstacle to  successful negotiations is the confusion 
between  parties  and  mediators  in  peace  negotiations,  i.e.  when  countries  which  are 
objectively party to  a conflict become part of a multinational  "mediating framework" 
(e.g.  IG.Ap/Sudan;  SADC/D.R.Congo,  ECOWAS/Guinea-Bissau),  or when one  party 
accuses  either  the  mediator  him/herself or a  country  taking  part  in  a  mediation,  of 
involvement in the conflict (e.g. "Arusha group"!Burundiffanzania in 199617). The risk 
of this can be diminished if the negotiations are conducted in a transparent way under 
OAU or UN auspices - albeit often at the price of  making the process "heavy" and more 
bureaucratic. 
(ii) Before and during consultations or negotiations, Special Envoys can play a role as 
mediators,  keep  the  EU  institutions  and  member  states  informed,  and  assist  in 
harmonising diverging positions among EU member states and in  developing EU 
strategies.  Within  the  geographical area of the  ACP  countries,  the  EU has only one 
Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region. The assignment of Special Envoys for other 
conflict areas, particularly West Africa, might be considered. 
(iii) A general principle of any negotiated settlement of a conflict is the need to achieve 
compromises acceptable to all major stakeholders. If  one of  the major players is better 
off  by rejecting an agreement or by failing to respect it, such an agreement will not hold. 
Peace is not necessarily the highest goal for all actors. To make peace more attractive, the 
international community, and notably the EU, should offer assistance to those working 
towards peace and threaten with sanctions those who reject or violate cease-fires or peace 
agreements. This policy may be combined with the organisation of regional conferences 
where  political  and  security  aspects  are  discussed  in  parallel  with  development 
programmes. 
(iv) Due attention has to be given to include all actors, both at national and local levels. 
The Central African region is host to more than twenty armed groups with sometimes 
dubious political objectives. The ranks of these rebel groups are  filled with a growing 
army  of frustrated  youths  without  viable  economic  or political  perspectives.  Their 
capacity of destabilisation ("pouvoir de nuisance") should not be underestimated, and 
peace agreements have to address the underlying poli~ical and socio-economic problems, 
which are the bedrock of organised crime and political violence. Furthermore, there is 
often a need for  dialogue and reconciliation efforts at local level (notably in Kivu, 
16 Rwanda, Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone etc.), to avoid that the root causes of  the crisis are 
"papered over" by superficial agreements between governments. 
(v) A particularly critical situation may arise when negotiations break down or if the 
conflicting parties use a temporary cease-fire for re-anning and the re-positioning of  their 
troops. In this case, the international community should put the utmost pressure on the 
parties to initiate or resume dialogue, and the European Union, in co-ordination with 
the United Nations, should consider specific measures to that end (arms, aid or trade 
embargoes, visa restrictioDs, freeziDI of assets of leaden wbo refuse to Degotiate or 
do Dot abide by agreemeDts etc.). In such cases, all possible steps should be taken to 
prevent the flow of  anns to the conflict region. 
(vi) Peace agreements may require independent monitoring of  cease-fires, or need to be 
consolidated  through  external  security  assistance  (peacekeepiDg  operatloDs).  Any 
intervention of  this type, however, carries the risk of  facing a new escalation of  violence. 
(vii)  In  recent  years,  the  international  community has  been  looking  increasingly  for 
African  s~lutions in peacekeeping and crisis response. However, the various initiatives 
to-develop African peacekeeping capacities by external training have had ambiguous 
results: On the one hand, there are indications in specific cases that these efforts have 
enhanced the respect for human rights of  the trained soldiers. On the other hand, the fact 
that  several  annies  benefiting  from  training  under military  training  programmes  for 
peacekeeping  have  been  involved  in  anned  conflicts  or  controversial  military 
interventions cannot be overlooked. 
(viii) The Community's role in the framework of  the "negotiation scenario" could take 
various forms: support for mediatioD efforts or negotlatioD processes; support for a 
political  transition  (technical  assistance  for  constitutional  reform,  electoral 
asslstaDce  and  monitoring);  assistance  for  the  reintegration  of  refugees  and 
displaced people, for rehabilltatioD, aDd for demobillsatioD programmes etc. 
(c)  BREAKDOWN OF STATE AUTHORITY 
If a conflict simmers on without being resolved, albeit at a level which makes it 
disappear from the headlines in the international media, it often becomes a low  int~nsity 
war zone where nonnaJ state authority evaporates partly or completely. In a number of 
African countries, basic administrative, economic and social structures were kept alive 
essentially by NGOs and community-based organisations. Normal  state administration 
has often retreated because of  civil war or lack of  resources, to the more easily accessible 
towns or provinces. It is only a small step from this situation to a total breakdown of  state 
authority  and  the  establishment  of a  system  where  various  territories  fall  under  the 
control of  Warlords. 
The breakdown of  state authority can be limited to certain areas, which fall under 
the  control  of Warlords or become  subject  to  zones  of influence of neighbouring 
countries with remaining and active state authorities. Much of what has been outlined 
under the  scenarios  above  would  apply  to  countries  involved  in  an  ongoing  internal 
conflict in a neighbouring country. In rare cases, an entire state can actually cease to exist 
(e.g.  Somalia) and its territory as  well as adjacent areas in neighbouring countries can 
17 escape any government control. In most cases of state breakdown, the countries or areas 
concerned become major sources of  instability. 
(i) Normal development co-operation, just as normal diplomatic or economic relations, is 
interrupted in the case of  a breakdown of state authority. Humanitarian assistance, can 
be extended where security conditions allow it.  Rehabilitation can be supported in areas 
where  a  relative  peace  prevails  ("peace  dividend  approach"),  including  "social 
rehabilitation"  in  the  form  of community  initiatives for  peace and  reconciliation.  The 
Commission's responsibility to  assess  the (short, medium and long-term) impact of 
humanitarian aid on the political and military situation will be of  primary importance. 
(ii) EU member states should  do  the  utmost  to  prevent the export of arms into  the 
conflict region. 
(iii)  The  EU  may  consider  support  to  "frontline  states"  to  the  extent  that  their 
governments remain receptive to the EU's concerns about human rights and democratic 
principles, and practice full transparency concerning military expenditures  . 
••• 
These three scenarios are typical cases while reality usually lies somewhere 
in  between.  It is  also  possible  - even  probable - that  the situation  evolves  or 
deteriorates from  one  scenario to  another.  The EU response  has  to  be  flexible 
enough to react in a modulated way to real developments on the ground. 
4.  FINAL REMARKS 
The strategy proposals outlined in this Communication indicate ways to react to 
political emergency situations, which have tragically become all too frequent to be called 
exceptional. In his report on "The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable 
Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa", the UN Secretary-General mentioned 
that 30  wars have been fought  in Africa during the last three decades.  Since  16  April 
1998,  when  this  report was  circulated as  a General  Assembly document,  fighting  has 
broken out at the border of Ethiopia and Eritrea as well as in Guinea-Bissau and Sierra 
Leone, Botswana's and Southern African military forces have intervened in Lesotho, and 
the Congo crisis has escalated into a regional war of unprecedented dimension in post-
colonial  Africa.  The  Angolan  peace  process  has  broken  down,  leading  to  a  full 
resumption of civil war.  The armed conflicts in Southern Sudan, Northern and Western 
Uganda and  Northwestern  Rwanda carry  on  with  varying  intensity,  causing  recurrent 
humanitarian  catastrophes.  Somalia remains  under the  rule  of Warlords.  Many  other 
countries are rife with tensions. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  sub-Saharan  Africa  is  undergoing  major political 
upheavals that carry a tremendous potential  for violent conflict. The consequences of 
this  transformation  are  quite  unpredictable.  The European Union  has  to  find  ways  to 
assist its ACP partners in sub-Saharan Africa in this process and to manage the crises that 
accompany this transformation. First and foremost, the European Union should focus on 
the  prevention  of conflicts  and  implement  the  recommendations  contained  in  the 
Communication of the  Commission submitted to  the Council  in  March  1996,  and  the 
Common  Position  and  Council  Conclusions  adopted  on  this  subject.  The  Common 
18 Position  concerning  human  rights,  democratic  principles,  the  rule  of law  and  good 
governance in Africa, adopted 25  May  1998,  is  also an  important CFSP instrument to 
assist  African  countries  steering through  the  current  political  changes.  The  European 
Union  should  do  its  utmost  in  the  framework  of its  co-operation  and  foreign  policy 
relationship to facilitate peaceful change towards stable and democratic systems. But 
it  also has to  be ready to  manage, contain and resolve the crises that have turned 
violent, and develop appropriate strategies to this end. 
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